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to the owner of the servitude is an enforcement of the adequate
development covenant, and this is almost impossible due to the
fact that it could not be enforced prior to the expiration of the
primary term of the lease, but would have to be enforced be-
fore the accrual of the prescription on the servitude. Another
fact that would make the remedy less available to the servitude
owner is that he would have to show that he had received a bona
fide offer of lease from a third party, and it would be difficult
for him to secure any such contract in view of the fact that he
owns only a fractional portion of the mineral rights. Such a re-
sult is indicative of the myriad problems with which the court
has been faced in construing the laws formed under the rule of
capture to fit the conservation policy. In spite of the reluctance
of the court to overturn any prior mineral law decision due to the
fact that they establish rules of property, it is apparent that a
reconsideration of the Hunter-Shell decision is necessary.
John B. Hussey, Jr.
Tax Consequences from Dispositions of Carved Out
Oil Payments - Ordinary Income or Capital Gain?
Classification of a particular item of income as either ordi-
nary income or capital gain is a matter of considerable concern
in terms of the amount of tax to be paid. One source of income
which has posed a difficult problem in regard to its nature for
income tax purposes is the "oil payment." For federal income
tax purposes, an oil payment' has been defined as a right to oil
and gas in place that entitles its owner to a specified fraction of
his transferor's share of production from the property, limited
by a certain sum of money or a specified number of units of oil
or gas. 2 Oil payments are used extensively in the industry, there-
by making the classification of income from transfers of such
payments particularly important.
The problem of distinguishing between ordinary income and
capital gain is not a new one, nor in many areas has it been ade-
1. BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 25 (1954).
2. The law relative to gas payments is the same as that relative to oil pay-
ments. For the sake of simplicity, references in the text will mention only the
oil payment; however, the discussion is equally applicable to gas payments.
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quately solved.3 Despite myriad decisions and several legisla-
tive reforms, 4 a certain lack of clarity persists. It has been sug-
gested that, if there were some clear legislative intent as to
whether ordinary income and capital gain were to be considered
as two parallel but mutu£lly exclusive classifications, or whether
one category is an exception to the other, the problem would be
less difficult for the courts.5 If one were an exception to the
other, any doubtful case could be resolved in favor of the domi-
nant category. This was the approach followed by Mr. Justice
Clark in the Corn Products case.6 Capital gain was considered
as the exception and ordinary income the general rule.7 How-
ever, many recent tax court and court of appeals cases have been,
where doubtful, resolved in favor of capital gain treatment,8
which would seem to indicate a feeling contrary to that of the
Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court has thus far
denied certiorari in all of these cases.9
While it must be admitted that the policy behind the capital
gain provisions is not clear, there are some underlying reasons
behind the capital gain notion that merit examination. One such
reason given for affording certain transactions capital gain
treatment is that of mitigating the burden on the taxpayer of
having to pay in a single year at the progressive ordinary income
rates a tax on gain from property which has increased in value
over a number of years.'0 In other words, the owner of property
that increases in value over a period of years actually "earns"
a portion of the increase in each of the several years during
which the property has been held, but without having "realized"
3. See Proceedings of panel discussions, reported in FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY 307 et seq. (printed for the use of the Joint
Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 12, 1955).
4. For a discussion of the general problem of distinguishing ordinary income
from capital gains, see Dakin, The Capital Gains Treasure Chest, 14 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 505 (1954). See also Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Cri-
tique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 1057 (1950).
5. Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 738 (1956).
6. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
7. Id. at 52, with its predecessor, Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
stand alone for the proposition that capital gain is the exception.
8. E.g., Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Commissioner V.
Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) ; Commis-
sioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953) ; McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
9. See note 8 supra.




any gain for income tax purposes until the property is disposed
of.11 Hence, by denominating the income from this disposition
capital gain, it is taxed at a rate considerably lower than the
rate applied to ordinary income, 12 the theory being that the tax
burden imposed by the capital gain rate on the entire amount
of the transaction will approximate the tax which would have
been levied each year on that year's increment at the ordinary
income rate. 8 However, certain inroads have been made in this
notion of averaging "bunched" income. This is evidenced par-
ticularly by the fact that the period for which an asset must be
held in order to merit long term-capital gain treatment has been
reduced to only six months.' 4 The result is that it is now more
common to offer a second explanation for capital gain treatment:
that the taxation of capital transactions at a lower rate will en-
courage taxpayers to risk funds in capital investments and to be
more willing to dispose of their capital assets, thereby maintain-
ing a more fluid economy.' 5 The current rules as to capital gain
treatment are to a great extent the result of the efforts of pres-
sure groups, especially in the securities and investment areas,
who desire to be encouraged to risk their funds. 6 Such pressures
will remain as long as the great disparity between rates on ordi-
nary income and capital gain remain. These two theories cannot
be reconciled, yet they are both, to some extent, the basic expla-
nations for the present capital gain concept.
Generally speaking, capital gain results when a capital asset,
which has been held six months or longer, is sold.1 7 According to
11. Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines gross income
as "all income from whatever source derived, including . . . (3) gains derived
from dealings in property." Taxable income (gross income less deductions), de-
fined in § 63, is taxed to individuals at progressive rates ranging from 20% to
91% under § 1. If there is an excess of net long-term capital gain, from the sale
or exchange of capital assets held longer than six months, over net short-term
capital loss, § 1202 allows a deduction amounting to 50% of such excess to deter-
mine the taxable income to which the § 1 rates are to be applied. Alternatively,
the taxpayer may choose to have the capital gain component taxed at a flat rate
of 25% under § 1201. In the case of corporations, § 11(b) (2) imposes a normal
tax of 25% on gross income. In addition, § 11(c) imposes a surtax of 22% on
gross income in excess of $25,000.00. Corporate capital gain is taxed at a flat
rate of 25%.
12. See note 11 8upra.
13. See Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains
Taxation: II, 59 YALE L.J. 1057, 1058 and authorities cited therein (1950).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3).
15. Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, General Revenue
Revision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess, at 965 (1953).
16. Dakin, The "Capital Gains" Treasure Chest, 14 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW
505, 506 et seq. (1954).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-223.
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Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, the term "capital
asset" means property held by the taxpayer, whether or not held
in connection with his trade or business."' This is the general
rule from which certain specific items of property are excepted. 19
Thus, the question of whether an item of income should be treat-
ed as ordinary income or capital gain seems to turn on whether
property not within one of the named exceptions is involved.
However, the problem of construing "property" for purposes of
Section 1221 is not a simple one.
While the problem of differentiating between ordinary in-
come and capital gain has been apparent throughout the income
tax law, it has been particularly acute in the area involving the
transfer of oil and gas payments. 20 One of the primary questions
to be considered is whether the oil payment is "property" as de-
fined in Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code and as such
subject to capital gain treatment. Since many transfers of oil
payments can be characterized either as sales of property or as
payments received in lieu of income, they could, under a literal
construction of the Code, be treated as resulting either in ordi-
nary income or capital gain. Litigation in this area has been
extensive, and somewhat unproductive in the sense that it has
failed to produce any consistent pattern upon which one can
speculate with any degree of accuracy as to how the next case
will be decided. A brief look at the nature of the oil payment
should prove of some assistance at this point.
An oil payment is either "retained" or "carved out."21 It is
said to be retained if the owner of any interest in an oil prop-
erty assigns his interest and retains an oil payment, payable
out of future production from the property interest assigned.22
An oil payment is said to be carved out if the owner of any inter-
18. Id. § 1221.
19. Id. § 1221(l)-(5). The excepted items are: (1) inventory, stock in trade
and items held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business;
(2) property used in a trade or business subject to depreciation under § 167 or
real property used in the trade or business (gains on these items being taxed at
capital gain rates while losses are permitted to be deducted as ordinary losses
under § 1231) ; (3)\ copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, or
similar properties held by the creator or his donee; (4) accounts or notes re-
ceivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for services rendered
or from the sale of property described in the first exception; (5) certain short-
term government securities.
20. For additional discussion of the tax problems developing from the use of
oil payments, see Comment, 10 Sw. L.J. 802 (1956); Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
1088 (1956).
21. BREEI io & BuwTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 63-64 (1954).
22. Id. at 63.
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est in any oil property assigns an oil payment to another person
but retains his interest in the property from which the oil pay-
ment is assigned.28  While the retained oil payment and the
carved out oil payment are basically similar, the tax consequences
from the use of the two devices are considerably different.
In the case of the retained oil payment, there is no real prob-
lem since the person retaining the oil payment cannot be said to
have anticipated ordinary income.24 In such cases, the holder of
the retained oil payment does not receive the value of the oil
payment in one lump sum, but in fact receives it periodically dur-
ing the life of the oil payment. The assignor or vendor of an oil
property who retains an oil payment will be required to allocate
the income tax basis of the property prior to the assignment be-
tween the interest assigned and the oil payment retained in pro-
portion to their respective fair market values.25 The reason for
this allocation is that the holder of the oil payment who receives
a share of production in the form of income is entitled to a de-
pletion allowance. 26 The cost so allocated to the retained oil pay-
ment will then become the basis for depletion and for computa-
tion of gain or loss on the sale.2 T If the retained oil payment is
subsequently sold, any gain would be treated as capital gain
unless the seller is a dealer in such properties.2
In the area of carved out oil payments, there has been some
confusion in applying the law; the tax consequences of using
carved out oil payments are consequently by no means clear. The
carved out oil payment has been successfully used as a means of
financing the development of new oil properties.29 In such cases
23. Id. at 64.
24. In the case of a "retained" oil payment, the transaction is one resulting in
capital gain or loss to the assignor. The law seems clear on this point. See Com-
missioner v. Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
25. Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), acq. on
other issues, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 2 and 1943 Cum. BULL. 5, aff'd, 118 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1941) ; American Liberty Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 262 (5th
Cir. 1942) ; G.C.M. 23623, 1943 CUM. BULL. 313.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 611-614; Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling Co.,
130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Lee v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942) ;
Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 566 (1939).
27. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 15 B.T.A. 1195, 55 F.2d 17, 287 U.S. 299
(1932) ; Lee v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942).
28. McLean v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 670 (1941) ; Cullen v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Ham-
monds v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Commissioner v. Flem-
ing, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
29. For a general discussion of the various uses of this financing device, see
Jackson, Tax Planning Before Drilling: The Operator's Problem, 27 TUL. L. REV.
21, especially at 27 et seq. (1952).
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the transactions are not taxable ones at the time of the transfer,
since they are treated for tax purposes as pooling or sharing ar-
rangements. 80 The real problems have developed as a result of
holders of working interest8' or larger oil payments disposing
of the periodic income they are receiving from such interest in
order to obtain an immediate lump sum and have such sum taxed
at the lower capital gain rate. 2 A brief review of some of the
recent cases, Internal Revenue Service rulings, and amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code will graphically point up, the prob-
lem.
While some earlier rulings of the Internal Revenue Service
dealt with the subject of dispositions of carved out oil pay-
ments,8 3 General Counsel's Memorandum 24849 represents the
basic position of the Commissioner and the Service. 34 It was the
opinion of the Chief Counsel that consideration, not pledged for
development, received for the assignment of a short-lived oil pay-
ment carved out of any type of depletable interest in oil and gas
in place, including a larger oil payment, is, in the hands of the
assignor, ordinary income subject to the depletion allowance.8 5
However, in the same memorandum, the Chief Counsel refused
to express an opinion with respect to the status of oil payments
extending over a substantial portion of the life of the depletable
economic interests from which they are carved. 6 Four years
later, the Internal Revenue Service, in I.T. 4003 amended their
prior position and ruled that the assignment of any oil payment,
not pledged for development, which extends over a period less
than the life of the depletable property interest from which it is
carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income from the
property interest.8 7 Therefore the assignment, for a'considera-
30. Appleman, Sales and Assignments of Leases and Other Interests in Oil
and Gas, FIRST OIL AND GAS INSTITUTE, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION
427, 457-63 (1949) ; Williams, Assignment of Leasehold, Royalty and Oil Pay-
ment, SECOND OIL AND GAS INSTITUTE, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 469,
502-15 (1951). See Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 566 (1939).
31. BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME 22 (1954) : "The
working interest, for federal tax purposes, is an interest in oil and gas in place
that is burdened with the cost of development and operation of the property."
32. The taxpayer is not to be condemned for this, since he has the right to
take any legal course with his property or business which lightens or lessens his
tax load. See Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1955), and au-
thorities cited therein.
33. I.T. 3693, 1944-Cum. BULL. 272.
34. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 66.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cm . BuLL. 10, 11.
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tion, of any such oil payment results in the receipt of ordinary
income by the assignor which is taxable to him when received or
accrued. In the same ruling, the Commissioner extended the rule
covering donative assignments of carved out oil payments,38
ruling that they too were assignments of future income.89 The
rule announced in I.T. 4003 does not apply where the assigned
oil payment constitutes the entire depletable interest of the as-
signor in the property, or a fraction extending over the entire
life of the property. 40
While these rulings express the Internal Revenue Service's
position on the problem, the courts have not been willing to fol-
low them in most of the cases dealing with this point. The first
case to deal squarely with the problem of how to treat, for income
tax purposes, the disposition of a carved out oil payment was that
of Lester A. Nordan,41 which involved a donation of a carved out
oil payment to a church, with a reversion to the taxpayer after
the church had received a certain amount from the oil payment.
The tax court allowed Nordan a charitable deduction for the fair
market value of the gift at the time it was made. The court said
that the taxpayer had made more than a mere assignment of in-
come to the.church, and had in fact transferred property which
subsequently produced income. 42 In 1954, the tax court decided
the case of John D. Hawn,48 citing the Nordan case." In the
Hawn case the tax court, by a split decision, held the oil payment
which Hawn had transferred to be a capital asset which had
been held for more than six months and the gain was therefore
taxable as long term capital gain.45 The facts of the case were
that Hawn transferred to a contractor an oil payment that he
had held for some time. The contractor agreed to build a house
for Hawn and, when the contractor had received a certain
amount of income from the oil payment, the oil payment would
38. I.T. 3935, 1949-1 Cum. BULL. 39.
39. .I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 10, 11.
40. Ibid. The fraction assigned that runs for a time concurrent with the life
of the property assigned would be an overriding royalty.
41. Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).
42. The court was of the opinion that no income from the property had ac-
crued at the date of the transfer by gift of oil, gas, and minerals in place, and
that the income accrued from the production of oil after the petitioners had con-
veyed the property. Id. at 1134.
43. John D. Hawn, 23 T.C. 516 (1954). As will be pointed out later, the
Hawn case was reversed by Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956).
44. Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).




revert to Hawn. Hawn claimed that the gain from the transfer
of the oil payment, which paid out in nineteen months, was long
term capital gain.40 The Commissioner, citing G.C.M. 24849 and
I.T. 400347 argued that the gain realized was ordinary income. It
was the contention of the Commissioner that this transaction was
nothing more than the anticipation of ordinary income on the
part of Hawn, especially in view of the fact that the payment
paid out in such a short period of time. However, there was no
jurisprudence which squarely supported the Commissioner's
position, while on the other hand, Hawn cited to the court sev-
eral cases involving different issues but still standing for the
proposition that an oil payment is an interest in the oil in place
and therefore entitled to capital gain treatment.48 It should be
noted that six judges dissented in the Hawn case and were of the
opinion that the oil payments constituted ordinary income to the
petitioner, Hawn.49
Before the Hawn case reached the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, that court handed down a decision in Caldwell v.
Campbell,50 which involved a sale of carved out oil payments to a
tax exempt foundation. The court rejected the Commissioner's
position that the transactions resulted in anticipation of ordinary
income and found that there was in fact a sale of property inter-
ests and that capital gain resulted therefrom. One judge dis-
sented, being of the opinion that the transaction involved an
anticipation of ordinary income. 51 A plethora of decisions in the
tax court followed in the wake of the Hawn and Caldwell de-
cisions, with all of them resulting in capital gain treatment for
oil payments. 52 The developing pattern of cases was broken when
the Hawn case reached the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
46. Ibid.
47. G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 66; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 10.
48. Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954) ; T.W. Lee, 42 B.T.A. 1217, aff'd,
126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942).
49. Hawn, 23 T.C. 516, 523 (1954). In his dissent, Judge Arundell was of the
opinion that one vested with the right to receive income cannot "escape the tax
by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skillfully devised, by which he
procures payment of it to another, since, by the exercise of his power to command
the income, he enjoys the benefit of the income on which the tax is laid."
50. Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
51. Id. at 573.
52. John Wrather, T.C. Memo. 55-104 (1955); R. B. Cowden, T.C. Memo.
55-128 (1955) ; William Fleming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955) ; A. J. Slagter, Jr., 24 T.C.
935 (1955) ; W. F. Weed, 24 T.C. 1025 (1955) ; P. G. Lake, Ins., 24 T.C. 1016
(1955) ; O'Connor v. Scofield, 143 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Tex. 1956).
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cuit. In reversing the decision of the tax court, the court was
careful to distinguish it from the decision in the Caldwell case.53
The ground of distinction used by the court in these two cases
has become the test for classifying oil payments as producing
ordinary income or capital gain: the substantiality of the pay-
ment in regard to time and amount.
54
Under the substantiality test, if the court finds that the
carved out oil payment will take a substantial portion of the life
of the property to pay out or that it represents a substantial por-
tion of the entire property, then it will be afforded capital gain
treatment. Otherwise, the transaction will be held as anticipa-
tion of income and will be subjected to the ordinary income tax
rates. It is of particular interest to note that one day prior to the
decision of the Hawn case, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas decided the case of O'Connor v.
Scofield, which involved the sale of an oil payment with a rever-
sionary clause providing for reconveyance to the original vendor
when a stipulated amount had been received by the purchaser.55
In ruling for the taxpayer and finding that the transaction in-
volved the sale of a capital asset that resulted in capital gain
rather than ordinary income, the court indicated that it, too, was
applying the substantiality of interest test.56 The court found
that the property interest was substantial and real, and repre-
sented a substantial part of the grantor's royalty interest. While
the payment was paid out in three years, the court noted that
the oil payment would have taken an appreciably longer period
to pay out had it not been for the fact that there was an increase
in production and in the price of oil. 57 The O'Connor case has
been appealed and argued before the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, but no decision has been handed down yet. It will
be interesting to note how the court disposes of this case and
whether and to what extent the court will narrow the gap be-
tween what has been found to be substantial and insubstantial.
All of the cases mentioned thus far have arisen in Texas,
where the owner of a mineral interest is considered under Texas
property law as having an interest in the oil in place.5 No case
53. Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340, 345 (1956).
54. Ibid.
55. O'Connor v. Scofield, 143 F. Supp. 240 (W. D. Tex. 1956).
56. Id. at 242.
57. Ibid.
58. 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 61, n. 8 (1954).
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could be found involving property in Louisiana from which there
had been a sale or gift of a carved out oil payment with a rever-
sionary provision. However, considering the difference in the
basic concept of ownership of minerals in Louisiana, some specu-
lation as to the application of the principles announced in the
Hawn and Caldwell cases would be in order. Under the ruling of
Milling v. Collector of Revenue5" the Supreme Court of Louisiana
in reviewing the prior jurisprudence on the subject announced
as well settled the proposition that the payment of a royalty
under a mineral lease is the payment of rent.60 This being the
case, the Commissioner's anticipation of income argument would
seem to be much stronger and would probably prevail relative to
Louisiana property, especially in the light of the numerous cases
dealing with anticipatory assignments of income in areas other
than oil and gas.61 However, in the case of Palmer v. Bender, the
United States Supreme Court, in deciding a depletion problem
held that under Louisiana law a retained royalty represented an
economic interest in oil in place.62 While this decision was hand-
ed down before most of the development of the mineral law of
Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court has never reversed
the Palmer case. Therefore, since the characterization of "an
economic interest in oil in place" is the very term used by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in deciding oil payment
cases, it is quite possible that this proposition might be success-
fully urged before that court on the authority of Palmer v.
Bender.
It is readily apparent that the substantiality of interests test
leaves much to be desired. Primarily, the substantiality test fails
to establish any rational basis for decisions. If, under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, the basic requirement is the satisfaction
of the property requirement of capital gain, then it would seem
that all of these fact situations involving carved out oil payments
should receive the same treatment, either as ordinary income or
capital gain, assuming, in the case of capital gain, that the other
59. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952).
60. Ibid.; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La.
751, 170 So. 785 (1936) ; Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46
(1931); Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167
La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928).
61. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Harrison v. Schoffner, 312
U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281
U.S. 111 (1930) ; Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir.
1954) ; Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
62. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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requisites of capital gain are present. 63 Furthermore, it is not
at all clear what length of time or amount of money or oil is
necessary to constitute a substantial payment. Even if this were
clearly delimited, changes in production or market price could
make a planned transaction calculated to be substantial, insub-
stantial because the payment would pay out sooner than had been
anticipated. Uncertainty is therefore inherent in the distinction.
On the other hand, if the carved out oil payment is not prop-
erty within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, then it
would seem that the income from the sale of such carved out oil
payments would be ordinary income subject to depletion.6 4 The
legislative history of the capital gains provisions indicates that
"real" property was meant to describe an interest greater than a
mere right to receive income, even though the source of the in-
come might be real property. 5 It could well be argued that a
carved out oil payment cannot properly be considered property
within the meaning of the capital gains provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
If income from carved out oil payments is considered in the
light of the theory that capital gain is grounded in the notion of
granting relief to recipients of "bunched income," 66 income from
carved out oil payments should not be afforded capital gains
treatment. Under the "bunched income" notion, the taxpayer
who owns property that increases in value over a number of
years cannot realize income for tax purposes each year as the
yearly increment accrues, but must allow them to become
"bunched," with the result that when he does sell the property all
of the increase will be realized in one year for tax purposes.
Under the present system of graduated income tax rates, the
resulting tax burden might be confiscatory. On the other hand,
the owner of an oil payment receives income periodically from
the property, so that under the normal course of events his in-
come from the property will not be realized in one lump sum.
When the taxpayer sells an oil payment, he is voluntarily "bunch-
ing" periodic income into one lump sum. Therefore, the taxpayer
has precipitated the "bunching" himself, and consequently there
is no compelling reason for a lower tax rate.
63. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-1223.
64. See id. §§ 61(a), 611-14; MILER, OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION 158 (1951).
65. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 119 (1942).
66. See note 13 supra.
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The need for additional legislation is apparent. The Eighty-
fourth Congress had on its calendar, when it adjourned, a bill
which would have cleared up most of the trouble in this area.6 7
It provided basically for treating the proceeds from the sale of a
carved out oil payment as ordinary income subject to depletion. 68
Although the bill died in committee, it is highly probable that the
same or a similar one will be offered in the present session of
Congress.
Richard F. Knight
The Fictitious Payee Doctrine Under the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
When an instrument is payable to order, an endorsement by
the payee or by one authorized by him to endorse is necessary in
order for one to maintain an action on the instrument as holder.1
Likewise, a valid endorsement of a check which is payable to
order is necessary before the drawee may debit the drawer's ac-
count without incurring liability to the drawer for the amount of
the check.2 However, if the instrument is payable to bearer it
need not be endorsed in order for one to maintain an action on
it" or for the drawee to debit the drawer's account. 4 Usually it
is obvious whether an instrument is payable to order or bearer,
and hence, whether a valid endorsement is necessary. But the
fictitious payee doctrine operates to make paper, ostensibly
drawn to order, bearer paper. This doctrine, therefore, becomes
important in determining whether a valid endorsement of an in-
strument which purports to be order paper is necessary and,
67. H.R. REP. 9559, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
68. Ibid. The general provision of § 633 would have read: "(1) General
Rule.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), the proceeds from the sale of an
oil, gas, or production payment out of a larger property, as that term is defined
in section 614(a), shall be considered income subject to a depletion allowance."
1. United Motor Car Co. v. Mortgage & Securities Co., 128 So. 307 (La. App.
1930).
2. The drawee bank assumes the duty of paying out the depositor's money only
on the order of the depositor. If the drawee pays out money on instruments bear-
ing a forged endorsement and debits the drawer's account, it has failed to pay
according to the depositor's order and has thus breached its duty to the depositor.
The depositor may require the drawee to recredit his account even if the drawee
bank used all possible diligence in making payment. See BRITTON, BILLS AlD
NoTEs § 142 (1943).
3. Hillman v. Kropp Forge Co., 340 I1. App. 606, 92 N.E.2d 537 (1950).
4. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 So.2d
576 (La. App. 1955).
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